The recent volatility of stock prices has caused many people to conclude that investors have become irrational in valuing at least some stocks. This paper investigates the behavior of the volatility of stocks on the Nasdaq, which tend to be smaller companies with more growth options, in relation to the more seasoned issues reflected in the Standard & Poor's 500 portfolio.
Introduction
The recent behavior of the stock market has been highly unusual in many ways. The stock prices of technology firms have fluctuated wildly at times when more traditional industrial firms have been relatively stable. The after-market performance of many initial public offerings (IPOs) has also been dramatic, with large positive returns followed later by equally large declines. The goal of this paper is to investigate the characteristics of this recent market behavior as a first step in understanding what has occurred.
The focus in this paper will be to identify the sectors of the market that have behaved unusually. In some ways, this motivation is similar to the recent paper by Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) , who find that firm-specific (idiosyncratic) volatility rose steadily from 1962-97, even though market and industry volatility did not. My focus, however, will be on the data since 1997, where the most unusual behavior has occurred. 1 Figure 1b shows the ratio of VXN to VIX. These graphs clearly show that the Nasdaq 100 index has become unusually volatile compared with the S&P 100 portfolio since mid-1999. There was also an episode during the last half of 1995 when the VXN was unusually high relative to the VIX, but the relative level of these volatility indexes remained stable from 1996 through mid-1999.
What kinds of factors could lead to uncertainty in one sector of the market? Behavioral economists might point to a bubble in the stock prices of technology-related growth stocks that burst. It is not unusual to find large increases in volatility following big drops in prices. French, Schwert, and Stambaugh (1987) , Schwert (1989a) , and Pagan and Schwert (1990) were among the early papers showing that this effect is broad and pervasive at the market level.
However, the association between price drops and volatility is not necessarily evidence that an irrational bubble has burst. There has been much recent discussion of an economic slowdown. To the extent that the boom in the economy in recent years is concentrated in the technology sector, it would not be surprising if negative news about future growth could have much stronger effects on technology stocks.
In addition to Nasdaq and technology, I will also investigate the association between firm size (equity capitalization) and recent volatility. As a generalization, smaller firms tend to be less diversified and younger, so they tend to be riskier than larger firms in the same industry.
However, the recent evidence seems to contradict this generalization.
Section 2 analyzes Nasdaq volatility using several alternative measures. Section 3 analyzes New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock Exchange (Amex) volatility using measures that are similar to the Nasdaq measures in Section 2. Section 4 evaluates some of the plausible explanations for recent volatility. Section 5 concludes and speculates about the implications of this evidence for economic policy.
Nasdaq Volatility
In addition to the implied volatility data in figure 1, returns to several portfolios of stocks provide evidence on recent volatility. To simplify exposition, I calculate the volatility of returns using a rolling 21-day standard deviation of returns, adjusted to an annual rate by multiplying by the square root of the number of trading days in the year, 253,
where µ is the sample mean over the same 21-day window. While this measure is simple, it closely approximates the forecast of volatility from the kinds of complicated econometric models.
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Implied volatility
The CBOE reports implied volatility for the S&P 100 portfolio (VIX) beginning in 1986.
It is calculated by taking a weighted average of the implied volatilities of eight OEX calls and puts. The chosen options have an average time to maturity of 30 days. Fleming, Ostdiek, and Whaley (1995) describe and analyze this volatility measure. Recently, the CBOE has begun to compute and report a similar measure for the technology dominated Nasdaq 100 portfolio (VXN). Figure 2a shows the historical volatility of the Nasdaq Composite portfolio from January 1973 through March 14, 2001 along with the VXN Nasdaq implied volatility series that starts in 1995. Two things are apparent from this graph. First, the level of volatility of Nasdaq returns is very high since 1999, with only the 1987 stock market crash producing comparable levels of volatility in the past. Second, the volatility of returns implied by options prices has been much higher then the actual volatility throughout most of the period since VXN has been computed. Figure 2b shows the historical volatility of the Nasdaq Composite portfolio along with VXN from January 1995 -March 14, 2001 . This graph makes it clear that the rise in Nasdaq volatility has occurred since mid-1998 and that with few exceptions, the implied volatility measure has been substantially above the actual measure. Figure 3a shows the historical volatility of the S&P 500 portfolio from January 1973
Nasdaq and S&P Historical volatility
through March 14, 2001 . It also shows the historical volatility of the S&P 100 (OEX) portfolio along with the VIX implied volatility series that start in 1986. The level of volatility of the S&P portfolios rose in mid-1998 at the time of the Japanese and Russian financial crises, but it returned to more normal levels by early 1999. There have been brief increases in S&P volatility in early and late 2000, but nothing compared with the rise in Nasdaq volatility. Given that some of the large technology firms that influence Nasdaq volatility are also included in the S&P portfolios (including Cisco, Microsoft, Intel, and Oracle which comprise over 17% of the index in November 2000), it is surprising that S&P volatility has not increased more. Figure 3b shows the historical volatility of the S&P 500 and S&P 100 portfolios along with VIX from January 1995 -March 14, 2001 . This graph makes it clear that the implied volatility measure VIX has been substantially above the historical volatility except in the few periods when volatility has jumped in this period.
Actual versus Implied Volatility
Figures 2b, 3a, and 3b make clear that implied volatility has been generally higher than actual volatility. What does this mean? There have been many papers in the finance literature that show that implied volatility adds information to forecasts of future actual volatility, but it appears that implied volatility is a biased forecast (since it is almost always too high). Assuming that the CBOE is an efficient market (and its active trading with low transactions costs suggest that this is plausible), the systematic bias in the implied volatility measures must mean that the option pricing model that is used to calculate implied volatility omits important factors that influence market prices of options. For example, the Black and Scholes (1973) model assumes that volatility is deterministic, or at least that changes in volatility do not influence option prices.
To the extent that unexpected changes in volatility create risk that could influence option prices, implied volatility estimates that ignore this factor would be biased.
3 Figure 4a shows the ratio of implied to historical volatility for the S&P 100 and the Nasdaq 100 from January 1995 through March 14, 2001. Interestingly, these ratios are very similar since la te 1997. From 1995 through most of 1997, the ratio of Nasdaq implied to actual volatility was higher than for the S&P portfolio.
It is important to remember that actual and implied volatility measure different things.
Actual volatility reflects what has happened in the last month, whereas implied volatility reflects what option traders expect will happen over the next month. Therefore, figure 4b plots the ratio of implied volatility to the actual volatility over the next 21 trading days (about one month) for both the S&P and the Nasdaq portfolios. In a sense, this is a plot of forecasts divided by actual outcomes. The ratios are almost all above 100% because the forecasts are biased upwards. The larger spikes in figure 4b compared with 4a imply that the increase in implied volatility in late 1998 and 2000 was too large compared with subsequent realized volatility. In other words, these sharp increases in volatility did not persist as long as option traders thought they would.
It would be interesting to study the properties of the VIX and VXN as forecasts of market volatility in more depth, but that is beyond the scope of this paper. 4 For the purposes of the subsequent analysis, I interpret the results in figures 4a and 4b as supporting the measures of implied volatility from the CBOE as indicative that Nasdaq stocks have become much more volatile than the broader S&P portfolio. Figure 5a shows the historical volatility of the value-weighted (VW) and equal-weighted (EW) portfolios of Nasdaq stocks from the Center for Research in Security Prices at the University of Chicago (CRSP) from 1995-2000. Throughout this period, the volatility of the value-weighted portfolio is higher than for the equal-weighted portfolio, but this difference is much more noticeable since mid-1998. Figure 5b shows the historical volatility of the CRSP equal-weighted portfolios of Nasdaq stocks sorted by equity capitalization from 1995-2000. Decile 10 represents the largest firms and decile 1 represents the smallest firms. As implied by the higher volatility of the valueweighted portfolio in figure 5a , the large-firm portfolio is much more volatile than the small-firm portfolio.
CRSP Nasdaq Portfolios
Taken together, the results in figures 5a and 5b show that the unusually high volatility of Nasdaq stocks since mid-1998 is concentrated among the largest Nasdaq stocks. This is somewhat surprising, since historically the small-firm portfolio of NYSE stocks from CRSP has been more volatile than the large-firm portfolio of NYSE stocks. Section 3 will see whether the most recent period has reversed this result. Figure 6a shows the historical volatility of the CRSP value-weighted (VW) and equalweighted (EW) portfolios of NYSE stocks from 1995-2000. Figur es 6 (NYSE) and 7 (Amex) are drawn to the same scale as figures 5a and 5b to ease comparison with the results for the Nasdaq portfolios. Since 1996, the volatility of the value-weighted portfolio is higher than for the equal-weighted portfolio, but this difference is much smaller than was true on Nasdaq in figure 5a. Figure 6b shows the historical volatility of the CRSP equal-weighted portfolios of NYSE stocks sorted by equity capitalization from 1995-2000. Decile 10 represents the largest firms and decile 1 represents the smallest firms. As implied by the higher volatility of the value-weighted portfolio in figure 6a , the large-firm portfolio is more volatile than the small-firm portfolio.
NYSE and Amex Volatility
Again, however, the differences and absolute levels of large firm volatility are much smaller than for the Nasdaq portfolios in figure 5b. period, although the differences between the Amex portfolio volatilities are not large.
These figures show that the unusual volatility of large Nasdaq firms since mid-1998 is not a phenomenon of firm size, since it does not show up for Amex stocks and it is considerably muted for NYSE stocks. It is likely that it is the types of Nasdaq firms that have large equity capitalization that explains this result.
Plausible Explanations Technology Portfolios
Many of the large firms on Nasdaq, including Amgen, Cisco, Dell, Intel, Microsoft, . As with the earlier graphs, it is apparent that the volatility of these portfolios has increased dramatically since mid-1998. It is interesting that the biotechnology portfolio behaves in much the same way as the computer and telecommunications portfolios, since it is hard to think of similarities in the demand for the products of these firms.
Moreover, it is clear that it is not just "Internet fever" that has raised the volatility of these firms.
Indeed, there is a period in mid-2000 when the volatility of the biotechnology portfolio is noticeably higher than for the computer and telecommunications portfolios.
Value and Growth Portfolios
Standard & Poor's and Barra have created portfolios that are segment the S&P 500 portfolio into "value" and "growth" portfolios. Figure 
Recent IPOs
Another aspect of financial markets that has attracted a lot of attention in recent years is the very active IPO market. Figure 10 shows the number of IPOs per month in the US since 1960 and the average initial returns to IPO investors from buying at the IPO price and selling within the next month in the secondary market. These data are available on Jay Ritter's web page [http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipoall.htm] and they are described in Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1988, 1994) . Lowry and Schwert (2001) study and try to explain the dynamics of the apparent IPO cycles.
While the number of IPOs since 1998 has not been unusually high compared with the rest of the 1990s, the average initial return to IPO investors has been very high since mid-1998, averaging about 56% since July 1998 compared with 18% for the entire January 1960-January 2001 period. Thus, issuing firms and their investment banks systematically under-valued the stock of IPO firms when setting IPO prices, especially in the last few years. Ritter (1991) and Loughran and R itter (1995) argue that the initial returns to IPO investors represent excess enthusiasm by the after-market, rather than under-pricing by investment bankers. They show that returns realized by purchasing recent IPOs in the secondary market are lower than for investments in other more-seasoned stocks. On the other hand, Brav
and Gompers (1997) show that the after-market performance of IPO stocks is similar to more seasoned stocks that are matched on firm size and market/book ratios.
Since initial IPO returns have been so high in recent years, and since many of these firms were technology stocks listed on Nasdaq, it is possible that part of the recent rise in Nasdaq volatility is related to (or even caused by) the after-market pricing of IPO stocks. To exa mine this question, I created three equal-weighted portfolios of stocks that had recently had IPOs using information from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database. The "All IPOs" portfolio contains all stocks that had an IPO at least one month before, but no more than one year before, the trading day in question. The exclusion of the first month of after-market trading avoids the problem of after-market price support (which happens in some but not all IPOs) that can distort the volatility of returns. The "Technology IPOs" portfolio includes stocks that are categorized as technology stocks by SDC, and the "Non-technology IPOs" portfolio contains the remainder of the IPO stocks. To put these data into perspective, figure 12 shows the ratio of the volatility of the technology IPO portfolio to the volatility of the value-weighted CRSP Nasdaq portfolio from 1984-2000. It is startling (to me) that this ratio is so close to 100% since 1993 (the average is 110%). Thus, it looks as though the volatility of the prices of recent IPOs is remarkably similar to much larger more seasoned Nasdaq securities.
Big Price Changes
The analysis thus far has focused on the standard deviation of returns (volatility), but the characteristic of recent Nasdaq behavior that has attracted the most public attention has been the days when large negative returns have occurred (somehow people don't seem to write or talk as much about comparably large positive returns). Table 1a shows the largest percentage changes in the Nasdaq Composite portfolio between 1995-2000 in column (1). The corresponding returns to the S&P 500, S&P Technology, Nasdaq Computer, and Nasdaq Biotechnology portfolios are in columns (2) through (5). Columns (6) and (8) contain the implied volatilities for the S&P 100 (VIX) and Nasdaq 100 (VXN) portfolios from option pric es on the CBOE.
Columns (7) and (9) contain the changes in the implied volatilities from the prior day, ∆VIX and ∆VXN. (2000) argue that the Microsoft antitrust lawsuit had substantial common implications for many other firms in the computer industry, so it may not be surprising that broad groups of technology stocks would move together in response to this news.
The Fall episode centers on the presidential election which dragged on into early December before the uncertainty about its outcome was resolved. However, in both April and October there were many stories about earnings announcements, speculation about changes in Federal Reserve policy, and a variety of stories about macroeconomic indicators that foreshadowed slower growth in future months.
Interestingly, stories about lower earnings and slower growth were used by reporters and analysts to explain both large negative and large positive movements in market prices.
Another pattern that emerges strongly from table 1a and 1b is that volatility and prices moved in opposite directions. When prices fell in table 1a, the implied volatility of the Nasdaq 100 portfolio rose dramatically (∆VXN in column (9)). It is also apparent that for most of the days in table 1a, the performance of the Nasdaq portfolio was driven by technology stocks, since the S&P 500 return in column (2) was generally much smaller than the returns to the technology portfolios in columns (3) through (5). The implied volatility of the S&P 100 portfolio also rose on most of these days (∆VIX in column (7)), but the size of the rise was smaller than for ∆VXN.
The results in table 1b for increases in the prices of Nasdaq stocks parallel the results in table 1a. The biggest returns are driven by technology stocks and volatility decreases when prices rise.
As mentioned previously, the opposite contemporaneous movement in volatility and returns is often seen in stock returns and it has been studied extensively. The fact that there are similarly large positive and negative daily returns in tables 1a and 1b suggest that high volatility is the dominant characteristic of this period, not just a few big drops in prices. In many ways, this is more like the behavior of market indexes during the Great Depression, when there were prolonged periods of high volatility, than the brief episodes of volatility that surrounded the October 1987 crash (see Schwert (1990a Schwert ( , 1990b for comparison).
World Stock Market Conditions
As a final check on the conclusion that the recent episodes of Nasdaq volatility have been concentrated in the technology sector, figure 13a shows This is a stark difference from the behavior of the Nasdaq technology stocks shown above, so the explanation for the behavior of the Nasdaq stocks cannot be related to general market conditions.
Conclusions
Are there any policy implications from the recent episodes of volatility in the technology sector of the market?
An Impeding Recession?
At the aggregate level, there is much evidence that stock volatility is a leading indicator for economic activity, with heightened volatility often associated with recessions (see Schwert (1989a Schwert ( , 1989b and Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) as examples). It is an interesting question whether the extent that the recent growth in Nasdaq volatility foreshadows a dramatic slowdown in the technology sector of the economy. To the best of my knowledge, no one has studied the relation between industrial stock return volatility and real activity in that industry. If there is such a link, the very high recent levels of volatility in the technology sector of the stock market could foreshadow a massive recession in this area of the economy. On the other hand, there is not evidence yet to suggest this will occur.
Too Much Leverage?
In terms of financial regulation, many proposals have arisen in the past in response to perceptions that volatility was "too large." For example, Hardouvelis (1990) suggests increasing margin requirements as a way to discourage investors from trading in stocks. Schwert (1989a Schwert ( , 1989c and Hsieh and Miller (1990) argue that Hardouvelis finds statistical associations between margin requirements and aggregate volatility because the Fed had increased margin requirements in the past when stock prices fell and that volatility also rose when prices fell, so there is no causal link between the regulatory changes and observed volatility. 5 It is interesting that despite arguments such as those made by Hardouvelis (who was working at the New York Fed at the time), the Federal Reserve Board has not changed the level of margin requirements since 1974, which strongly suggests that the Fed is skeptical about the efficacy of margin requirements as a policy tool.
Too Much Trading?
Another related theme that has often arisen is that the costs of trading have become too low so that investors can trade in and out of stocks quickly and frequently without bearing substantial transaction costs. Of course, for this to be a problem, it must be that there are lots of "noise traders" taking advantage of this opportunity and that their trading influences prices in an important way.
One variant on this theme is that the availability of derivative securities, such as options or futures contracts on individual stocks, or on portfolios of stocks, such as the Nasdaq 100, allow investors to place large risky bets on the movements of a small subset of stocks. The existing evidence, however, shows that volatility of the returns to the underlying security typically declines after the introduction of derivatives trading (e.g., Skinner (1989) ).
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There has also been much recent discussion about "day trading" by relatively small individual investors and the potential effect of this trading on the volatility of market prices.
During the Clinton administration, there were significant advocates for taxes on securities transactions (STTs) to "throw sand in the gears" of financial markets, including Joseph Stiglitz (1989) and Lawrence Summers (with Victoria Summer, 1989) , who were the chair of the Council of Economic Advisors and the Secretary of the Treasury, respectively (although not at the time they were advocating securities transactions taxes). There are many reasons to think that STTs are a bid idea and, fortunately, they have never been enacted in the United States.
Where they have been enacted, trading typically just moves to another venue with lower transaction costs (e.g., Schwert and Seguin (1993) ).
It is a well-known fact that trading volume and volatility occur together, and the trading volume of large Nasdaq technology stocks has been high during the period when Nasdaq volatility has been high. It would be naïve, however, to conclude that this association is causal, so that reducing trading by increasing transactions costs would somehow make volatility go away. To the extent that volatility is associated with differences in beliefs, it is not surprising that volume and volatility occur together.
In short, it is not clear to me what the implications of recent Nasdaq volatility are for the macroeconomy. Likewise, it is not clear to me that we need to do anything about it. It is clear to me that these data deserve more study.
6 Also see Edwards (1988), Rubinstein 1988), and Tosini (1988) . Table 1a Largest percentage drops in the Nasdaq Composite portfolio between 1995-2000 in column (1). The corresponding percentage changes (returns) to the S&P 500, S&P Technology, Nasdaq Computer, and Nasdaq Biotechnology portfolios are in columns (2) through (5). Columns (6) and (8) contain the implied volatilities for the S&P 100 (VIX) and Nasdaq 100 (VXN) portfolios from option prices on the CBOE. Columns (7) and (9) contain the changes in the implied volatilities from the prior day, ∆VIX and ∆VXN.
(1) Table 1b Largest percentage increases in the Nasdaq Composite portfolio between 1995-2000 in column (1). The corresponding percentage changes (returns) to the S&P 500, S&P Technology, Nasdaq Computer, and Nasdaq Biotechnology portfolios are in columns (2) through (5). Columns (6) and (8) contain the implied volatilities for the S&P 100 (VIX) and Nasdaq 100 (VXN) portfolios from option prices on the CBOE. Columns (7) and (9) contain the changes in the implied volatilities from the prior day, ∆VIX and ∆VXN.
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